REFLEXIONS
UPON THE
CONDITIONS
OF
PEACE
Offer'd by
FRANCE,
AND
The MEANS to be Employed for the procuring of Better.

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EDWARD COOKE.

REFLEXIONS UPON THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE, &c.

SINCE Persons who are possess'd with too great an Opinion of the Power of *France*, and are ignorant of the Reasons that oblige that Crown to wish to see an End of the War, may be apt to imagine that the *Conditions of Peace*, which were proposed in *Sweden* by the Count *d'Avaux*, ought not to have been so disdainfully rejected; it may not be amiss to shew how Captious and Unjust those Conditions are, and how necessary it is to look upon them as a Snare which we ought to be very cautious of falling into.

'Tis certain, that they leave *France* in a Condition to Break the Treaty, which it would make with the Allies, upon the first favourable Occasion that should present it self; which I hope to prove very plainly in the Sequel of this Discourse: And it cannot be doubted but that our Enemies will be ready to renew the War, after the Term of some few

Years, and to push on their Arms with so much the more fury, as they shall then find fewer Obstacles to their Designs, if they are not reduc'd to such Restitutions as shall give us Security that they shall not dare again to violate their Words.

I may say, That if their Ambition could have suffered any Bounds, the *Treaty* of the *Pyrenees* had remain'd inviolated: For it did, indeed, give *France* very considerable Advantages. The quitting them, *Thionville*, *Montmedy*, and *Damvilliers*, laid the Archbishoprick of *Treves*, and the Dutchy of *Luxemburgh* open to them; That of *Avesne*, *Philippeville*, *Landrecy*, *Quesnoy*, *Arras*, *Graveline*, and many other Places in the *Low-Countries*, put them in a Condition to push on their Conquests farther that way; and the other, of *Roussillon* and *Conflans*, opened them a Door to attack *Spain* it self. The Minority of the *King*, the Weakness of the *Ministry* which the Factions of Don *Jean* of *Austria* had disjoynted, and the War which then broke out between *England* and *Holland*, were sufficient Reasons for a Rupture; and the Imaginary Rights of the Queen of *France* upon *Brabant*, served for a Pretence. The Storm then fell upon the *Low-Countries*, and the French carried Terrour and Desolation thorough all those Parts. *Aeth*, *Tournay*, *Douay*, *Oudenarde*, *Alost*, *Armentieres*, *Bergues*, *Furnes*, *Dixmude*, *Courtray*, and *L'Isle*, receiv'd the Laws of the *Conqueror*; who seeing that the English and Dutch, after they had Agreed, were entered into an Alliance with *Sweden* to oppose that Torrent, judg'd it convenient to consent to a *Peace*; by virtue of which, he kept the Places that he had taken in the *Low-Countries*, and was content to restore to the Spaniards the *Franche Conté* which he had seiz'd, during the Winter, after a very weak Resistance.

Anno 1659. 1667. 1667. 1668. 1668.

This Treaty, which was that of *Aix la Chapelle*, was no more Sacred to *France* than that of the *Pyrenees*. It could not digest the Hollanders having stopt the Progress of its Arms, and to put them out of a Condition to traverse its Designs for the future, it was resolved to carry the War into their Country. The *French* found a Way to gain Intelligence

gence in the very Bosom of their Republick; they brought the Elector of *Cologne*, and the Bishop of *Munster* into their Interest; they seiz'd upon *Lorrain* for Precaution, to leave nothing behind them that might disturb them. In a word, the King of *England* was perſuaded to joyn with them, upon Condition that he ſhould have the *Maritime Places* of *Holland* and *Zealand*. But by a ſtroak of their Ordinary Policy, they made no Conqueſts but in the Inland Countries, where they were to keep what they got themſelves. *Anno* 1670.

I ſhall not ſtay to deſcribe the prodigious Succeſs which this Invaſion of the *French* had, in ſo favourable a Conjuncture. Every Body knows, that in leſs than Five Weeks they made themſelves Maſters of more than Forty Cities. But the Face of Affairs being changed by the Diverſion that was given by the *Emperor*, *Spain*, and the *Elector* of *Brandenburgh*, and by the Reſolution that was taken to put at the Head of the Armies of *Holland*, the *Prince* who now governs us, they found themſelves oblig'd to abandon all that they had taken from that Republick, to poſſeſs themſelves of other Places in the Spaniſh *Low-Countries*, which they could more eaſily keep. In effect, they made there ſo great a Progreſs, that King *Charles* II. forced by the Murmurings of his People, reſolved at laſt to oppoſe them, and to ſend his Forces into *Flanders*. A Paſs, which might have procured reaſonable Conditions of Peace for the Allies, if *France* had not found means to diſunite them in the Aſſembly of *Nimeguen*, and to conclude there a *particular Treaty* with *Holland*, which was quickly followed by a *general* one; by which, beſides almoſt all the Places that were Conquer'd before the Peace of *Aix la Chapelle*, the French kept *Condé*, *Valenciennes*, *Cambray*, *St. Omer*, *Ypres*, and all the *Franche-Conté*. 1672. 1675, 1676, 1677. 1678, 1679.

But this was not enough to ſatisfie their Ambition. The Conjuncture was ſo favourable, that it gave them much higher Expectations. King *Charles* II. was in their Intereſt, the *United Provinces* weakened, and *Spain* in a very low Condition. The Elector of *Brandenburgh*, and ſome other

Princes of the Empire, were discontented; the *Emperor* taken up with the Revolts in *Hungary*, and expecting every day all the Turkish Force upon his Hands. The Occasion was too inviting to be neglected; and therefore *France* took this Opportunity to seize upon *Strasbourg*, (a Place which may be justly stiled the principal Key of the Empire,) to buy *Casal* of the Duke of *Mantua*, to block up *Luxemburgh*, to enter into the *Low-Countries*, and there to raise vast Contributions; which, for all that, did not prevent their Burning and Plundering; and besides all this, by the Trick of establishing *Chambers* at *Metz*, *Brisac*, and *Besançon*, they usurp'd all the Fiefs of the Empire which they found convenient for them, all along the *Rhine*, and the *Moselle*, under the Pretence of *Re-union*, making the next Places always Dependencies upon those which they had last taken.

Anno 1681, 1682, 1683.

It cannot but be said, that so many Hostilities committed in the midst of Peace, gave the Character of an unmeasured Ambition: And yet what followed, is yet more odious. *France* could not conceal its Joy, when it saw the *Turks* before *Vienna*: It was in hopes, that after the Taking of that Important Place, the Princes of *Germany* must be forced to confess, that no other Power than that of *France* was capable of saving the *Empire*; and that, upon Condition that they would Elect the *Dauphin* King of the *Romans*, they might find there a Succour able to support them. *France* promis'd it self easily to oblige the *Turks* to a Retreat, and that their Troups being numerous, fresh and experienced, would not find it a difficult matter to conquer an Army that was composed of raw, new-rais'd Men, and diminished by near the one half, by the fatigues of a long Siege. Thus, after having used all their Endeavours to arm the *Turks* and *Teckely* against the Emperor; and after having brought them even to *Vienna* by their Counsels, and by large Supplies of Money, they had projected to have broken all the Treaties they had concluded with them; and *France* would have made it self a Way to the Empire, by driving them out of *Germany*. 'Tis no wonder then, that in such Circumstances the raising of the Siege of *Vienna* caused that shameful Uneasiness

eaſineſs which they could not forbear ſhewing there ſo publickly, and which was hardly ſweetned by the Taking of *Luxemburgh*, with which they were forced *then* to be content. *Anno* 1684.

This laſt Conqueſt was enough to open the Eyes of thoſe that were moſt blind, and to perſuade the *Emperor* to an Accommodation with the *Turks*; who being diſcouraged by their Loſſes, began to deſire Peace: And therefore the *French*, fearing that all the Forces of the Empire would be united againſt them, conſented to the *Truce* of *Twenty Years*; by virtue of which, they kept proviſionally all that they had uſurped ſince the Peace of *Nimeguen*. 1684.

This Truce held no longer than was neceſſary to put them in a Condition to break it; and an Occaſion quickly preſented it ſelf. *James* II. ſucceeded to the Throne of *England*, notwithſtanding his publick Profeſſion of a Religion that was condemned by the Laws of the Kingdom; and *France* engag'd him in a Secret Treaty; the Deſign of which, was the *Conqueſt* of *Holland*. It was in order to this, that they endeavoured to put the Electorate of *Cologne* into the hands of the *Cardinal* of *Furſtenburg*; that ſo, being Maſters of the Places which that Cardinal would have been in Poſſeſſion of upon the *Rhine*, and ſeizing upon the reſt, before the Princes of *Germany* had Time to recollect themſelves, they might make uſe of that River to carry their Ammunition and Proviſions to the very Frontiers of *Holland*.

'Tis very plain, that *Holland* being once Conquered, the Spaniſh *Low-Countries* could not avoid the Yoke of the Conqueror; who, on the other ſide, having brought the *Four* Electors of the *Rhine* to his Devotion, had but a *Fifth* to gain, to make the Dauphin be Elected King of the *Romans*: Beſides, it was time to make a Diverſion in Favour of the *Turks*, who were under a great Conſternation at the Taking of *Belgrade*: And it was upon this Condition only that they offered to continue the War againſt the Emperor. *France* had an Army very Numerous and well Diſciplin'd, Experienc'd Generals, and Magazines well Furniſhed, and wanted none of thoſe Reaſons of Intereſt, which

which seem to be the only ones they regard, to determine them to break the *Truce*.

Anno 1688. 'Tis no very great wonder then, that they resolved upon the Siege of *Philipsburgh*. 'Tis true, that the Advice they had a little after, That the *Prince* of *Orange* prepared to make a Descent upon *England*, should have obliged them to send an Army upon the Frontiers of *Holland*, rather than to attack the Emperor. This had been indeed the way to hinder a Revolution which seemed to be the only Turn which could deliver *Europe* from the Slavery into which it was just a falling. But looking upon the Project of the Descent as a Chymerical Thing, or at least imagining that the Success of it could not possibly be so sudden, or so prosperous as it was, they continued to carry Desolation into the Empire. The Taking of *Philipsburgh*, was follow'd by that of *Heydelberg*, *Manheim*, *Frankendal*, and *Mayence*; and they abandoned all the *Palatinate*, and the *Circles* of the *Upper Rhine* to Fire and Plunder.

This is too fair a Field to enlarge upon the Cruelties that are always the miserable Consequences of the *French Invasions*. 'Twas a small Matter that this Rupture carried with it all the imaginable Characters of Breach of Faith; That it was the Breaking of a Truce which *France* it self had sought, and from which it drew great Advantages; That it was broken, to raise the Hopes of the Enemies of Christianity, and to take the Opportunity of the Absence of the Imperial Troups which were employed in *Hungary*: They joyned to the Indignity of an Alliance made with the *Infidels*, and to the Injustice of the Rupture, all the Excesses that Violence could inspire: Fire, Sword, Profanation, and all that could be expected from the unlimited Licentiousness of the Soldiery, were employed to Ravage Countries, where they found no Resistance. There was no *Consideration* had of Age, or of Sex; no *Distinction* for any Dignity Ecclesiastick or Secular, and no *Regard* to Things or Places consecrated to the Service of God. They reduced *Cities* to Ashes, which had voluntarily opened their Gates, and to which the Dauphin had promised all good Treatment, in Considera-

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tion of the large Contributions they had juſt pay'd. They burnt a vaſt number of *Towns*, *Villages*, and *Caſtles*; and after having exhauſted, by a thouſand Extortions, a Countrey of above *Forty Leagues* in extent, they ruin'd it totally by a general Ravage, for no other Reaſons but to deprive the Armies of the Allies, which were then aſſembling, of the Means of Subſiſting. 'Twas now that wretched Incendiaries had the Confidence to commit all ſorts of *Sacrilege*, to violate the Aſhes of Princes, pillage Altars, burn Churches, pull down Palaces; and puſh on their Licentiouſneſs to ſuch Extremities that could not be of any Advantage to thoſe that authoriſed them, but muſt be attributed to nothing elſe but a blind Deſire of Ruining and Deſtroying. But 'tis needleſs to enter into the Particulars of theſe Cruelties, ſince the Examples of them are yet freſh; and the Recital can give but a very imperfect Idea of them. I ſhall only remark, That the Exceſſes we here mention, were not ſuch as were done during the heat of Action, but in cool Blood. The Orders of the Court were expreſs in them, the Generals preſided at their Execution, and if there were any who ſeemed to be leſs Vigorous, from the Horror of the Action, they were puniſh'd ſeverely for an Example.

If we follow the Conduct of *France*, through the whole courſe of this War, we ſhall diſcover every where the Marks of its *Breach of Faith*. The happy Succeſs which generally followed their Deſigns, could not hinder them from purſuing their End, by Means that were very Infamous. What Artifices have they not uſed at *Rome*, and with the Princes of that Communion, to repreſent this War as a *War of Religion*, which they engaged in barely for the Intereſt of King *James*? What have they not done, to divide the Allies? They have done what they could to form a *Neutral Party* in *Germany*, and to engage ſome Soveraigns to with-hold their Troups, and even to make ſome Motions that ſhould give Jealouſie to their Neighbours. They have endeavoured to take Advantage of the Circumſtance of the *Ninth Electorate* to oblige the Princes that oppoſe it, to engage themſelves; promiſing to ſupport their Pretenſions, if they

they would make a Diverſion in favour of *France*. They have left nothing untryed to blind the *Duke* of *Savoy* by advantageous Offers, and while they played ſo many Engines in the ſeveral Courts, they cauſed Conditions of Peace for the *Emperor* and the *Empire* to be propoſed at *Ratisbonne*, with a Deſign to draw them off from the *reſt* of the *Allies*; and to leave nothing unattempted, Endeavours were uſed at the ſame time to diſpoſe *Holland* to a *particular* Accommodation.

Anno 1693. The Secretary *Du Pile*, was diſpatched to manage this Negotiation, the Succeſs of which they hoped to facilitate, by ſome notable Enterprize in *Brabant*. *Our King* was the only Party that they thought it was in vain to lay ſuch Snares for, and it was for this Reaſon that they believed their ſureſt way to get him off their Hands, was to hire ſome *Villains* to *aſſaſſinate* him; who being found out, diſcovered thoſe that ſet them at work, and have left ſuch Stains upon their Memory as nothing will ever be able to waſh off.

1692.

'Tis certain, that the Method of *France* is to employ open *force* againſt thoſe who are unable to reſiſt; to uſe *artifice* with thoſe who 'tis probable may be ſeduced, and to have recourſe to *Poyſon* and *Aſſaſſination* againſt ſuch as it deſpairs to reach by Force or Artifice. How can we depend upon any Alliance made with them? They know they owe all their Succeſs to the Diverſion that is given by the Turks; They aſſure them by the moſt Sacred Promiſes, that they will never abandon them, and that they will never make a Peace without compriſing them in it, and yet at the ſame time, they propoſe Conditions of Peace to the Emperor, and inſinuate to him, that if he will accept of them, he may make his Market as he pleaſes with the Turks; and that having no other Enemies but them, he may triumph over them as he thinks fit. I need not infer after ſuch an Example, that the Allies have little reaſon to confide in the Promiſes of *France*, till they ſhall ſee it reduced to ſuch a Temper that it ſhall not be in its power to break them.

'Tis true *France* propoſes at preſent, Conditions of a *general* Peace; but 'tis not till they have ſeen all their Endeavours and their Projects eluded on every ſide; 'tis not till they have found

found thoſe unmoveable whom they hoped to have engaged in *Separate Treaties*. And ſince the Offers that are *now* made would leave *Germany* and the *Low-Countries* expoſed to their Invaſions, we ought to look upon them as an *Artifice*, the End of which, is to make thoſe Ambitious Deſigns ſucceed the more ſurely, which are not yet out of their View.

'Tis very plain, that there is nothing but what we have reaſon to fear, if *France* gets advantageouſly out of this Preſent War; and that after the Proof they have had of their Forces, they will treat their Neighbours hereafter with much more State than they have already done. This is certain, they have done Things which they could ſcarce think themſelves capable of doing; and therefore we have more reaſon to tremble than ever, if we do not make uſe of the *Preſent League*, to reduce them into their juſt Bounds. Experience has but too plainly convinced us, That there was need of no leſs than all the Powers that are united in the Preſent War, to make Head againſt *France*. But who can aſſure us, that it ſhall be poſſible to unite them a ſecond time? Can ſo many Circumſtances that met together to give birth to the League, concurr afreſh to form a *new* one? Every one knows, that to produce and confirm this Union, it was neceſſary that all the Allies were convinced of the Injuſtice of the French Proceedings: That every one of them in particular had experienced their unhappy Effects, and that one Common Danger had put them into an indiſpenſible Ne-

ceſſity of Defending themſelves. And how many Incidents have been neceſſary ſince? The *Retreat* of King *James*, the happy *Revolution* that followed it, and the *Reduction* of *Ireland*, have been the Degrees by which the Nation has been put in a ſtate to act with Vigour againſt the Common Enemy. It was not enough to be governed by a *Prince* that would not be diſcouraged by Difficulties, nor diſturbed by Dangers, who Commands his Armies in Perſon, and animates them by his Example. The ſtate of Affairs required, beſides this, that this Prince ſhould have Credit enough in *Germany*, to oppoſe, with Succeſs, the Intrigues of *France there*, and that he ſhould be at the Head of the Forces of a Powerful Republick both by Sea and Land. And ſure there will need no great Pains to prove, That ſince we cannot promiſe our ſelves a like Conjuncture hereafter, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary to make the beſt Uſe of it while we have it.

To this may be added, That ſome Years of Repoſe, would give *France* the Means of making a ſtronger Party in *Germany* and the *Northern* Courts; ſo that it would not fail to make uſe of the firſt Revolution that ſhould arrive in *Europe*, to renew the War. No body is ignorant, that 'tis their Policy not to Diſarm in time of Peace, and that the Revenue of that Crown is always the ſame; which gives it infinite Advantage, when it attacks thoſe who are uſed to Disband at the End of a War; and which keep up their Armies by Taxes, which are preſently interrupted by Peace. Beſides this,

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the King of *France* is *Abſolute* in his Government: His Frontier-Towns are extremely ſtrong, and in ſuch a Situation, as to Command all the neighbouring Countreys; ſo that he is always ready to *make* Invaſions, and out of danger of having them *made* on him, and the *unquiet Genius* of that Nation, together with the Care that is taken to form it to *Slavery*, requires frequent Wars abroad. Beſides, that Crown is ſo far from having the Happineſs and the Repoſe of its Subjects in view, that its main ſtudy is to keep them Low. The *Clergy* can no longer vaunt of any Prerogative; the King is as Abſolute over the Spirituality, as he is over the Temporality: All depends upon his good Pleaſure, which is now become the only Law of the State. The *Nobility* have loſt all their Priviledges; they are reduced to a neceſſity of cringing Servily to an *Intendant* of a Province; and have no other way to aſpire to any Diſtinction, but by low and unbecoming Submiſſions. The *People* groan under the moſt ſevere Oppreſſion that can be imagined. The *Parliament*, which was formerly a Mediator between the Soveraign and the Subjects, and maintained the Laws and Liberties of the Kingdom, by a wiſe Temperament between the Authority of the one, and the Obedience of the other, is now become nothing but an Engine to authorize the Injuſtice and the Oppreſſions of the Court. So that there is nothing on the ſide of *France*, which doth not give Apprehenſions of a *new* Rupture, if by a Treaty of Peace it remains in a Condition to inſult its Neighbours whenever it

ſhall have a mind to it. But this Fear will be yet doubled, if we conſider the neceſſity there would be of the Powers of *Europe* Uniting a ſecond time, and the Obſtacles that would either prevent or retard their Union. The *Emperor*, it may be, would be ſtill employed with the War againſt the *Turk*, and without doubt would be weaken'd by the Diſunion of the Princes of *Germany*, with whom *France* will have had the time to reſume its uſual Intrigues.

Add to this, That nothing can be concluded in the Empire, before a Reſolution taken in the *Dyet*; and Experience plainly ſhews to how many Delays and Conteſts thoſe ſorts of Reſolutions are ſubject. *Spain* would be as much as nothing, eſpecially as to the *Low-Countries*, which it would be then impoſſible to ſave. *Holland* would be drained by the Preſent War, diſcouraged by the Succeſs of it, and little diſpoſed to enter upon another: Beſides that, the Conqueſt of the *Low-Countries*, which the French would be able to poſſeſs themſelves of, before the Allies could reaſſemble their Forces, would put that Republick under the Diſcretion of the Conqueror: It would be no longer practicable for *England* to ſend Succours to thoſe that were ready to be Oppreſs'd, becauſe the French would have in their Power all the *Ports* of *Flanders*; and *Holland* would not dare to admit us into Theirs. We ſhould not be in a Capacity of medling with the Affairs Abroad, and it may be, not capable of making any conſiderable Effort for our own Preſervation.

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The only Remedy for all theſe Evils, but that a ſorrowfull and uncertain One, would be to remain Armed in time of Peace, as if it were in the Heat of War; otherwiſe *France* would break through all, at the firſt Shock, and making uſe of the advantage of the Surprize, would make in a very little time, ſuch a Progreſs as would render it Miſtreſs of the Fate of *Europe*. We ſhould be then expoſed to the inevitable Loſs of our Commerce, and to the Danger of falling under the Arms of *France*, if we did not even in Peace keep on foot a ſtrong Army at Land, and a great Fleet at Sea; and after having neglected to make ſuch a *temporary* Expence as might procure us a ſolid Repoſe, we ſhould find no other way to ſave us from utter Ruine, but the making our Taxes *perpetual*, and I believe every *Engliſhman* will conclude, that this is an Extremity with which the Expence we are now forced to be at, will not bear the leaſt Compariſon.

After what has been ſaid concerning the Conduct of *France* and its infraction of *former* Treaties, it may very well be concluded, that if that which is *now* offer'd be not ſufficient for the Security of the Allies, the Deſign is only to diſarm them, and to put them out of a Condition to oppoſe themſelves to New Uſurpations. The only thing to be done therefore is to ſhew in particular the Injuſtice of the Offers of *France*, and how very wide they are from what the Allies may reaſonably Expect.

When I ſpeak of the *Conditions* offer'd by *France*, I mean thoſe which the Count *d'Avaux* propoſed in *Sweden*; for I do not conceive the leaſt regard ought

ought to be had to a Project of Peace lately come from *Suisserland*, or to some others that run about without Name, and without Authority, because they are not to be considered, but as the Production of some particular Persons, who had a mind to see what Judgment the Publick would make of their Schemes.

To begin then, by what regards the *Empire*, it must be granted, that it is its Interest rather to continue the War to the last Extremity, than to yield *Strasbourg* to *France*. Indeed this Place being exactly well fortified, and of a great Circumference, having *Alsace* behind it, which is a Country fertile, and capable of entertaining at all times a numerous Army, and being situated in the middle of the *Rhine*, 'tis visible enough that 'tis quite of another Importance than *Fribourg*, and *Philipsbourg*, which they offer for an Equivalent.

To speak the Truth, 'tis ridiculous to comprehend *Philipsbourg* in this *Equivalent*; for by what Right doth *France* pretend to dispose of a Place to which it hath no manner of Title, and to offer it in compensation to the Empire, to which it doth without Controversie belong? I know very well, that the French besieg'd it, and took it in the Year 1688, but 'twas by the most palpable Injustice, and without having the least Pretence for a Rupture; and I must confess, That if it be lawfull for Christians to usurp the Lands of their Neighbours whilst they repose themselves upon the Faith of Treaties, and after having possessed their Places it be sufficient to restore *some* of them in order to keep

keep the moſt *important*, then *France* may make a Merit of the Reſtitution of *Philipsbourg*; but what Law, either Divine or Humane, did ever Authorize a Title of Acquiſition ſo unjuſt? I may add, That *Philipsbourg* without *Strasbourg*, is of no conſideration, ſince it is a Place locked within the Land of the Empire, unhealthy by its ſituation, and that cannot contain at moſt above a Garriſon of 3 or 4000 Men, whereas upon *Strasbourg* alone depends the Preſervation or Loſs of three Circles of the Empire, to wit, *Suabe*, *Franconia*, and the *Circle* of the *Upper Rhine*, that is to ſay, a third part of *Germany*; for *France* having an eaſie communication with *Strasbourg* by the Means of *Phaltzbourg* and *Lorrain*, would be in poſſeſſion of a Paſſage always open, and at the ſame time of a very conſiderable Place of Arms, and of a Magazine ſufficient for the greateſt Enterprizes.

Now the paſt Conduct of that Crown having ſhew'd us how much its Invaſions ought to be apprehended even in the midſt of Peace, I leave every one to judge whether upon the firſt Stir it could raiſe in the Empire, we ſhould not ſee the French fall upon *Ulm*, all the Countrey being open from *Strasbourg* quite to that Place; and if *France* were once Miſtreſs of *Ulm*, which is at the Head of the *Danube*, very eaſie to fortifie, and in the middle of a fertile Country, what would become of *Suabe*, *Franconia*, and all the *Upper Germany*? It muſt not be forgot here, that whatever re-eſtabliſhment may be pretended for the Duke of *Lorrain*, he muſt expect to ſee himſelf the Slave of *France*, if it keeps

Strasbourg

Strasbourg. The *Suiſſers* too, are no leſs intereſſed in the Reſtitution of this Place, which cuts off their Communication with *Germany*, on the ſide of the *Upper Rhine*, and commands that River from *Baſle* to *Philipsbourg*.' Tis true, the French offer to demoliſh the Works of *Huningen* and *Fort Louis*, which are beyond the *Rhine* in regard to *France*: But who doth not ſee that this Offer only tends to pay Appearances to ſave Realities? For if *France* keep the Works which it hath built on *its own* ſide, how can we hinder their raiſing again ſuch Works as are under the Cannon of thoſe which they ſtill deſign to keep? We know that they have Men ready, and would quickly find Money and all other Neceſſaries for ſuch a Work, ſo that at moſt this would but be a Buſineſs of about Six Months. Complaints would be made without doubt, againſt this, as a formal Contravention to the Treaty. But this would not much trouble them; and ſince it was not thought convenient to break with them when they poſſeſſed themſelves of *Strasbourg*, much leſs would it be likely to be done upon ſuch a Subject as *this*.

France would have enter'd into the Equivalent for *Strasbourg* the Reſtitution it offers to make of *Mont-Royal* and *Tarbach* to be diſmantled. But beſides that it can have no pretence in the World to keep thoſe Places, and that they are of no great Conſequence to that Crown, becauſe they are too remote, and are a great deal beyond *Treves*, which muſt be reſtored to the *Elector* of that Name; with what Confidence can Places belonging to the Elector of

of *Treves* be propoſed to the Empire in Compenſation for *Strasbourg*? The Buſineſs is to ſecure *Franconia* and *Suabe* which the yielding of *Strasbourg* would expoſe to certain Ruine, and *France* offers to demoliſh two Places upon the *Moſelle*, which it has no Right to keep, and which would ſignifie very little to the French; for in keeping, as they pretend to do, *Luxembourg*, *Saar Louis*, *Hombourg*, and *Bitch*, and remaining in poſſeſſion of *Thionville* that commands the *Moſelle*, they will be Maſters of all the Electorate of *Treves*, as far as *Coblentz*, as ſoon as they ſhall think fit to renew the War.

All the Equivalent for *Strasbourg* then, is reduced to *Fribourg*, which was yielded to *France* by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, and is offered to be reſtored in the Condition it is in at preſent. But is there the leaſt Compariſon between *Strasbourg* and a Place that is ſhut in with Mountains and Foreſts? which too is of very little Conſequence to *Germany*, becauſe it cannot open the French a way to pierce further into the Country, and during this War, it hath been enough to guard ſome Paſſes that are near it to render it altogether unprofitable to our Enemies.

Strasbourg is of ſuch Importance to the Allies, that 'tis ſcarce poſſible to imagine an Equivalent that can procure them ſo great a Security as the Reſtitution of that Place would give them. 'Tis certain, that though *France* could reſolve to

joyn *Brisac* to *Fribourg*, it would yet be far enough from making a Just Compensation.

Since then, the Safety of *Germany* depends upon the Restitution of *Strasbourg*; that this Place doth, without Controversie belong to the Empire; that it hath not been yielded by any Treaty; and that *France* hath *usurped* it since the Peace of *Nimeguen*, in the most unjust manner in the World: 'Tis as clear as the day, that that Crown ought to restore it without any Regret, supposing it resolves no more to trouble the Repose of its Neighbour for the future.

I know very well, that the Count *d'Avaux*, in the *Memorial* that he presented in *Sweden*, contends, That *Strasbourg* is necessary for the Security of *France*, and that his Master ought not to be pressed to the Restitution of a Place that would make the Emperor in a Condition to carry the War into *that* Countrey. But if it be necessary that some Body must run this Risque, is it not more reasonable that it should be rather the *Authors* of the Violence, than they that have suffered by it? Is it not just, that it should rather be a Crown that hath so often attack'd its Neighbours without any Pretence, than Princes who have taken up Arms only for their lawful Defence?

But I must add, That *France* would still have a Frontier good enough not to apprehend any Invasion; whereas, on the side of *Germany*, all is open, from

from *Strasbourg* to the *Danube*. Besides, an *Offensive* War is incompatible with the *Constitution* of the Empire; because, to resolve upon it, there must be the Consent of many Princes whose Interests are different, and among whom *France* hath always found Means to make her self Friends. In fine, 'Tis certain, that though *Germany* were perfectly United, yet it must have, for the attacking of *France*, the Help of all those Princes who are Confederates in this Present War: And 'tis easily seen, that such a League would be morally impossible. The Necessity of Self-Preservation, and the Sense of an impending Ruine, could scarce bring so many Soveraigns into the same Interests: And what Appearance is there, that they would enter into it again, barely out of a Motive of Revenge or Ambition? But though the Soveraigns should seem disposed, can it be thought that the People would contribute to it? and that they would be brought to deprive themselves of the Sweets of Peace, and the Advantages of Commerce, to begin a War purely *Offensive*? Can we imagine, that they would consent to drain themselves by Taxes, who have borne them hitherto only to save themselves and their Country from utter Ruine? It must be only Kings, who by a long Train of *Violences* are arrived to an *Arbitrary Power*, that can promise themselves such Marks of Obedience from their Subjects: It must be only People who are under a *Despotick Government*, who can, without murmuring, suffer their Soveraign to reduce them to the last Extremities of Misery,

in order to ſeize upon what doth not belong to him, and to render the Nation odious to its Neighbours by unjuſt Enterprizes; And by conſequence, 'tis only *France* from whence we can expect ſuch Projects; and we have all the reaſon in the World to believe, that 'tis in their Deſigns, if they refuſe to reſtore thoſe Places, that are neceſſary to execute them.

With regard to the *Reunited Countries*, *France* offers to ſubmit her ſelf to the Deciſion of *Commiſſioners*, and to the *Arbitrage* of the Republick of *Venice*. But ſince it hath ſeiz'd upon them ſo unjuſtly, and by its own Authority, it ought to begin by Reſtitution, to put Things into their former ſtate. 'Tis not juſt, that the Advantage of Poſſeſſion ſhould remain to thoſe who have uſurped it; it ought to return to thoſe who have loſt it by Tricks and Violence.

To this I ſhall add, That I can never perſuade my ſelf, that *France* would ſubmit to the Judgment of Arbitrators, if it ſhould not be for her own Intereſt; or that ſhe would make a Scruple of Keeping a Countrey, which no body could force her to Reſtore.

'Tis certain, that by making a Peace upon the Conditions that the French propoſe, they would be Maſters of all the Places which cover the Fiefs that are reunited, which would by conſequence be at their Diſcretion; and being then ſtronger,

and

and more formidable than ever, they might keep thoſe Fiefs without apprehending that any would dare to Begin the War, to oblige them to Reſtitution.

It would be no more difficult for them, a ſecond time to diſpoſſeſs the Duke of *Lorrain*; for who would take Arms for the Intereſts of that Prince? Would the *Empire?* But the French, by paſſing the *Rhine* at *Strasbourg*, would be able to carry the War into the Heart of *Germany*. Would *Spain*, or *Holland?* But would they have Courage to declare againſt a Power which is capable of reſiſting ſo many Allies? 'Tis viſible, that if by the Treaty of Peace the French keep *Luxembourg*, *Briſac*, *Huningues*, *Phalzbourg*, *Strasbourg*, *Fort-Louis*, and *Landau*, the Countrey they would reſtore to the Duke of *Lorrain*, would be encloſed in their own, and by conſequence at their diſpoſal.

And yet they puſh their Pretenſions further: They would keep *Saar Louis*, *Bitch*, *Hombourg*, and *Longuy*, which are the only Places that would remain to the Duke for the Security of his Perſon; and they renounce the *Four Ways* of Half a League in breadth, ſtipulated by the Fourteenth Article of the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, *no otherwiſe* but by reſerving a free Paſſage for their Troupes thorough *Lorrain*. But they have their Reaſons for this manner of proceeding. They may have a mind to make a new Invaſion upon the Empire, or the

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Low-Countries; and it would be their Intereſt to leave nothing behind them, and then the Duke of *Lorrain* is diſpoſſeſt again, and may be obliged to give up his Countrey for Lands of a like value in the Centre of the Kingdom.

'Tis in vain that *France* ſhould found it ſelf upon the *Treaty* of *Nimeguen* for what reſpects *Lorrain*, becauſe the *late* Duke never accepted the Offers that were made him by this Treaty; and *France* having violated it in ſo odious a manner, ought not to be admitted to draw any Advantage from it. It is yet more ridiculous to alledge the Treaties which they made the *Old* Duke of *Lorrain*, *Charles* III. ſign. while he was poſſeſſed with an implacable Hatred againſt his Relations, and blinded by his fooliſh Amours; thoſe Treaties cannot be to the Prejudice of the preſent Duke, who demands to be re-eſtabliſhed in the Poſſeſſions of his Anceſtres which lawfully belong to him.

France offers to the *Elector Palatin* what it has taken from him during this War. But what will it reſtore to that Prince? Heaps of *Aſhes* for ſtrong and rich Cities, horrid *Deſarts* for a Country fertile and well cultivated; and inſtead of Subjects whom Induſtry and Commerce had *enriched*, an infinite Number of *poor* Wretches, who muſt be a Charge to their Soveraign, and force him of Neceſſity to ſupport them in their Miſery. Is it Juſt that after having carried Fire and Sword through all the Countrey of this Elector, without having

having the leaſt Pretence for that Cruelty, there ſhould be no thoughts of any Satisfaction for ſo conſiderable Loſſes? But we ſhall ceaſe to wonder at it, if we conſider that at a time when 'tis ſo much the Intereſt of *France* to manage the King of *Sweden*, who is acknowledged as *Mediator* by all the Parties intereſſed in the War, the French King not only offers him the Dutchy of *Deux Ponts*, without giving any Account of the *Revenues* he has drawn from it, during its Uſurpation, but alſo continues to ruine that Dutchy by Extortions, which will for a great while render it unprofitable to the Prince to whom he ought to reſtore it.

The Renunciation of the pretended Rights of the Dutcheſs of *Orleans* upon the *Palatinate*, ought to be accounted for nothing. For ſince *France* hath inſiſted upon them, though they had been renounced by the *Contract* of Marriage with that Princeſs, and by the *Acquittance* they gave of the Payment of her Portion, 'tis certain that a Second Renunciation would not be more inviolable than the former. I might prove that the Palatin *Princeſſes* have no Pretenſions upon the States of their Family, nor upon what depends on them, as long as there are Palatin *Princes* and Dukes of *Bavaria* in the World, becauſe the one and the other deſcend from *Stephen* Count Palatin of the *Rhine*, Author of a famous Conſtitution in this behalf, which hath been conſtantly obſerved ever ſince in that Family. But 'tis not my Deſign to engage in a Diſpute

Diſpute that would carry me too far from my preſent Buſineſs.

With regard to the *Duke* of *Savoy*, I ſhall content my ſelf by ſaying, that if the Allies will keep a Prince in their Intereſts, who has ſo generouſly embrac'd them, 'tis but juſt that beſides the *Reſtitution* of what he has loſt, they ſhould procure him the Surrender of *Pignerol*; becauſe if *France* keep that Place, ſhe will be ſure hold that Duke in an entire Dependance.

France offers to renounce its Pretenſions to the *Low Countries*, in favour of the *Elector* of *Bavaria*, upon condition that the Emperor do the ſame on his part: But we are not to build upon any thing that is called *Renunciation* or Promiſe. We muſt talk only of *Reſtitution*. I had rather *France* would reſtore us Some, then promiſe us All. We know very well, that that Crown which hath broken all precedent Treaties when its Intereſt required it, will not change its Maxims if we conclude a Peace, that ſhould leave it in a Condition to attempt what it pleaſes; and ſince we cannot find *Guarrantees* capable of puniſhing it for its Infractions, nor *Oaths* more ſacred than thoſe it hath already violated, 'tis plain, that there is but *one* way of convincing us of the ſincerity of its Intentions, and that is, to make us a *Barrier* in the *Low Countries*, and upon the *Rhine*, that may prevent all our Fears; if it conſent to that, the Peace may be quickly made; if it refuſe, there is no ſafety for us, but in the continuing of the War.

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The ſame thing may be ſaid, in regard of the Renouncing the *Succeſſion* to the Kingdom of *Spain*. That of the *late Queen* was as ſolemn as could be wiſhed: It was confirmed by Oath: It was made, not by the Queen *alone*, but by the *King* her Husband, for *Himſelf* and *Succeſſors*, and yet they would now declare it Null and Void, under Pretence that it was not in the Power of the late Queen to do it in Prejudice to the *Dauphin*; and therefore we may aſſure our ſelves, that though the King of *France* and the Dauphin ſhould now conſent to a new Renunciation, it would ſignifie juſt nothing, without obtaining ſuch Reſtitutions as ſhould put it out of their Power to break their Words.

As to what regards the King of *Spain*, *France* conſents to reſtore him all that ſhe hath taken in *Catalonia*; and indeed, it is not ſo much their Intereſt to keep their Conqueſts on *that* ſide. Their principal Deſign is to make themſelves Maſters of the *Low-Countries*; and 'tis for that reaſon, that they will not conſent to make us a Barrier *there* ſufficient to ſecure us, but limit their Offers to the Reſtitution of *Mons*, *Namurr*, and *Charleroy*.

I do not ſee what Reaſon that Crown can alledge for the keeping of *Luxembourg*, a Place which indiſputably belongs to *Spain*, and which *France* ſeized on by *open Force* ſince the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, that is to ſay, in *full Peace*, and by the moſt bare-fac'd Violence in the World. Will they ſay, That this Important Place was yielded them at leaſt for *Twenty Years* by the Truce? But there is a great deal of

difference between a forced and *provisional* Ceſſion, and a free and *perpetual* one: Beſides, *France* having violated the Treaty of Truce, ſhould not in reaſon be permitted to enjoy any thing from it. Will they ſay, That *Luxembourg* is neceſſary for them, for the Security of their Frontier? This they are aſhamed to plead; ſince in the laſt War they could not break into *France* that way, though it were then in the Hands of *Spain*. In effect, *France* having *Thionville* to cover the *Moſelle*; *Verdun* and *Sedan* to cover the *Meuſe*; *Longuy* and *Montmedy* between thoſe two Rivers; and *Metz* more within, to ſerve for a Place of *Rendezvous*; 'tis evident, that it is in no Apprehenſions from any thing of this nature; and therefore, if they will be ſincere, they muſt confeſs, that they will keep *Luxembourg*, becauſe it covers the Electorates of *Treves* and *Cologne*, the Dutchies of *Juliers* and *Limbourg*, and a part of the Biſhoprick of *Liege*; becauſe it gives 'em a great Circuit of Ground; and becauſe its Situation is ſuch, that it facilitates the Succours which the *Low-Countries* might receive from *Germany*. One may truly ſay, That the Dutchy of *Luxembourg* is more Important to the King of *Spain*, than Half the *Low-Countries*; and it cannot be imagined, that *France* is ſincere in the Offers of Peace, when in ſo Capital an Article it ſays nothing of *Reſtitution*, no not ſo much as of an *Equivalent*.

They do conſent, indeed, to give one to the Biſhop of *Liege*, in the open Countrey of *Luxembourg*, for the Cities of *Dinant* and *Bouillon*. But how can they

they offer for two ſuch important Places, only a part of an open Countrey, which too belongs to the King of *Spain*. Beſides, by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, *France* engaged it ſelf to reſtore *Dinant*, upon Condition that *Charlemont* ſhould be yielded up to that Crown. This Condition was performed; and yet it did not hinder the French from keeping both the one and the other. They cannot therefore now refuſe to reſtore *Dinant*, after having detained it ſo unjuſtly, and if they pretend to keep it by a Treaty of Peace, it cannot be but with the Deſign to remain Maſters of the *Meuſe*, and to beſiege *Namur*, when the Conjuncture will permit.

'Tis out of all diſpute, That to give us any ſort of ſecurity on that ſide, we muſt have a *double*, and even a *triple* Barrier; or elſe the taking of *Namur*, or that of *Mons*, will carry the Enemy again into the Heart of the *Low-Countries*, and make the Conqueſt of them only the more eaſie. We have ſeen the French take thoſe two Places in a time when we had conſiderable Armies in *Brabant*, and when Diverſions were made in our favour on the ſide of *Germany*, *Italy*, and *Catalonia*. How then would it be poſſible to ſave them if *France* ſhould make a *new* Rupture, after it had diſarmed the Allies by a Treaty of Peace? We may aſſure our ſelves, that after the manner they now attack Places, one ſingle Campaign would be enough to render the loſs of the *Low-Countries* inevitable, and that the French would be Maſters of them, before the League (which muſt be form'd to make Head a-

gainſt them,) could be in a Condition to reſiſt them. 'Tis therefore abſolutely neceſſary, that *Mons* and *Namur* be covered by other Places, that may ſuſtain the firſt Efforts of *France*; and after the Experience we have had of the Forces of that Crown, we muſt ſee that there ought to be a better Barrier for the *Low-Countries*, then that which was fixed on by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*.

I ſhall not inſiſt upon the Conditions that are offer'd to *England* and *Holland*, becauſe they conſiſt only in the renewing of the *Treaties* of *Commerce*. I ſhall only ſay, that the great Intereſt of theſe two Nations, is, the re-eſtabliſhment of a good *Barrier* in *Flanders*, and *Brabant*. 'Tis a Truth of which none can doubt, that the Conqueſt of the *Low-Countries* would put *France* into a Condition of giving Laws to all *Europe*, and 'tis another Truth, that is no leſs Evident, that nothing can hinder the French from making this Conqueſt upon the firſt Occaſion, if we accept of the Conditions of Peace which they now offer us. The greateſt of our Intereſts then is here concerned, leaſt *France*'s being in Poſſeſſion of the Ports of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, and keeping the *Hollanders* in Slavery, or at leaſt in an indiſpenſible Neceſſity of remaining in a good Union with that Crown, the French ſhould become abſolute Maſters of *Our Commerce*; leaſt they ſhould oppreſs *Germany*, *Spain*, and *Italy*; whilſt we being ſhut up in our Iſland, and out of all Communication with the Continent, ſhould be Spectators of that Revolution, without being able to hinder it. 'Tis

'Tis visible therefore, that the *Safety* of *England* depends upon the Preservation of the *Low-Countries*. But what shall we say of the *Glory* of the Nation? 'Tis certain, that if we procure an advantagious Peace for the Allies, by continuing the War with the same Vigour that we have shewn hitherto, *England* will have the Honour of having saved *Europe* from *Chains*, and will remain the *Arbiter* of its Destiny.

'Tis the general Interest of all *Christendom* to re-settle the House of *Austria* in a sort of equality with *France*. This *Equilibrium* is necessary for the Security of the *People*, and even for that of the *Soveraigns* too. But 'tis the *particular* Interest of *England* to re-establish this Equality, that she may have the Ballance in her hand, and turn it to which side she pleases. This is the only Means we can make use of, not only to maintain the Empire of the *Sea*, which we have regain'd the possession of in so glorious a manner, but even to enable us to decide the Success of Wars, and the Conditions of Treaties for the future. The Nation begins already to recover in *Europe* the Rank which she ought to hold. Our Fleets are Mistresses of the *two* Seas; the Security of our Commerce is perfectly re-establish'd; we have seen the French reduced to a necessity of letting their Maritime Towns in the Ocean be burnt, while their *Fleet* is shut up, and as it were imprisoned in a *Port* of the *Mediterranean*, to avoid the being attack'd by ours. We have begun to stop the Progress of their *Arms* in

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the *Low-Countries*, and the taking of *Huy* is not of so little Importance, but that it opens a Way to greater Conquests, in giving us Opportunity to draw off a great part of our Garrisons from *Liege* and *Maestricht*. Besides, we may, without Flattery, say, that we have a numerous Army upon the *Rhine*, and may expect Great Things from the *Prince* that Commands it. The Duke of *Savoy* will be able to make a more considerable Diversion on that side, than he hath hitherto done, because he will Act in Concert with *our Fleet*; and 'tis to be hoped that the *Turks*, discouraged by their Losses, and being convinced that *France* would sacrifice them, will at length, by making an Accommodation with the Emperor, prevent the Danger they would be in, if they should be the last in making a *Peace*. Add to all this, the Extremity to which *France* finds her self now reduced. They are forced to abandon to us the Two Seas. They are under an Impossibility of *augmenting* their Forces by Land. Their *Commerce* is absolutely ruin'd; their *Subjects* discontented; and their *Troops* ill pay'd. In a word, if the Allies will but make the best of this Conjuncture, it seems most certain, that they must quickly obtain reasonable Conditions of PEACE, and that *Europe* may thereby Enjoy a Solid and a Durable Repose.

F I N I S.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THe History of the *Campagne* in the *Spanish Netherlands*, *Anno Dom.* 1694. With the Journal of the Siege of *Huy*. By *Edward D'Auvergne*, M. A. Rector of St. *Brelade*, in the Isle of *Jersey*, and Chaplain to Their Majesties Regiment of *Scots Guards*. Printed for *Mat. Wotton*, at the *Three Daggers*; and *John Newton*, at the *Three Pigeons*, near *Temple-Bar*, in *Fleet-street*. 1694.

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